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k (Yeni sayfa: {| border="1" |- |Descartes, perhaps following Plato, does insist that knowledge must meet two conditions: first, it must be of a real and independent object. We may feel headaches, for ...) |
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| − | |Descartes, perhaps following Plato, does insist that knowledge must meet two conditions: first, it must be of a real and independent object. We may feel headaches, for example, but as they are, in his sense, dependent entities, they are not proper objects of knowledge. That is one reason mathematical entities are selected by him (and many others from Plato onward) as the only true objects of knowledge. They are objects that are both eternal and independent of us. Second, knowledge claims are infallible; if something is known, it is known to be true.<ref>;Richard H. Popkin (1999) | + | |Descartes, perhaps following Plato, does insist that knowledge must meet two conditions: first, it must be of a real and independent object. We may feel headaches, for example, but as they are, in his sense, dependent entities, they are not proper objects of knowledge. That is one reason mathematical entities are selected by him (and many others from Plato onward) as the only true objects of knowledge. They are objects that are both eternal and independent of us. Second, knowledge claims are infallible; if something is known, it is known to be true.<ref>;Richard H. Popkin (1999), ''' The Columbia History of Western Philosophy''', New York: Columbia University Press, p. 340</ref> |
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08.30, 14 Eylül 2009 itibarı ile sayfanın şu anki hâli
| Descartes, perhaps following Plato, does insist that knowledge must meet two conditions: first, it must be of a real and independent object. We may feel headaches, for example, but as they are, in his sense, dependent entities, they are not proper objects of knowledge. That is one reason mathematical entities are selected by him (and many others from Plato onward) as the only true objects of knowledge. They are objects that are both eternal and independent of us. Second, knowledge claims are infallible; if something is known, it is known to be true.[1] |
- ↑ ;Richard H. Popkin (1999), The Columbia History of Western Philosophy, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 340